Monetary policy evaluation using structural macro models suggests that historical monetary policy responds less aggressively to inflation and the output gap than would an optimal policy rule. However, these results are obtained using models with constant term premia. This paper shows how term premia may depend on the policy rule specification and policy rate uncertainty. A more aggressive policy rule involves an economically important increase in term premia. Consequently, conclusions about the specification of optimal monetary policy rules based on counterfactual simulations of models that exclude term premia effects may not be valid.
Introduction
Interest in the analysis of monetary policy increased considerably in the 1990s with the development of a new variety of optimizing macro models. These models assume intertemporal optimizing behavior on the part of agents, sticky prices, no-arbitrage models of financial asset valuation, and interest rate feedback characterizations of monetary policy. Typically, alternative policy rules are evaluated in these models on the basis of what they imply for output and inflation variability.
A standard result in such counterfactual policy simulations is that historical monetary policy was not optimal and an outcome with lower inflation variability and lower output gap variability could have been achieved. Compared to empirical estimates of historical policy, a policy that responds more aggressively to output gaps or deviations of inflation from the policy goal would have been preferred. However, the benefits of more aggressive policy do not come without costs. In particular, although the variance of the output gap and inflation may be lower, the variance of the policy interest rate is higher. This paper suggests that increased policy rate variability may negatively impact economic activity through elevated term premia.
Consequently, conclusions about the specification of optimal monetary policy rules based on counterfactual simulations of models that exclude term premia effects may not be valid.
Several theories have been proposed to explain why policymakers have historically set monetary policy in a way that imparts a less variable path of interest rates than theory suggests is optimal.
1 Brainard (1969) shows how uncertainty about model parameters can reduce the response of policy to economic disturbances.
Data uncertainty should also reduce the responsiveness of policy to measures of economic activity (Orphanides (1998) ). Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) argue that dependence of the policy rate setting on the lagged policy rate may increase the influence of a given policy action on longer term interest rates, and hence economic activity. While their discussion shows how such a policy rule may lessen excessive policy rate volatility, they don't theoretically justify a preference for limited policy rate variability. Goodfriend (1991) suggests that policymakers may prefer a smoother policy rate path because they fear that sharp changes in policy rates may disrupt financial markets.
Some researchers have modified their economic models to recognize the apparent real-world constraints on policy rate variability.
In studies with parameter uncertainty, smoother policy is typically captured by reducing the response of the policy rate to output gaps and/or deviations of inflation from the policy target. In other studies, policy rate variability is assumed to be an exogenous constraint on monetary policy. One approach assumes the central bank minimizes output and inflation variability subject to an exogenously set bound on acceptable policy rate variability. Williams (1999) constrains policy by setting an upper bound on the variance of the policy rate, while Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) set an upper bound on the variance of the change in the policy rate. A second approach penalizes policy rate variability by specifying a central bank loss function that depends on policy rate variability in addition to output and inflation variability. Batini and Haldane (1999) , for example, specify policy loss functions that assign a weight to policy rate variability in addition to squared deviations of inflation from the inflation target and of output from trend. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , include the variance of the change in the policy rate in their specification of a policy loss function. In models where the variance of the change in the policy rate is included in the policy loss function, the tendency of policymakers to smooth policy rate changes is captured by including a lagged policy rate in the policy rate equation. This lagged interest rate is meant to capture that the policy rate is only partially adjusted to what a rule without lags would recommend.
This paper suggests an alternative motivation for constraints on policy rate variability. Term premia may depend on policy rate variability. The typical modeling approach specifies the the model's equations as log-linear approximations of the equilibrium conditions and assumes that term premia are constant (often zero). With this modeling approach, potential effects of increased policy rate variability on term premia will not be captured.
This paper examines how term premia may be related to monetary policy. A theoretical derivation shows how term premia depend on policy rate variability, economic uncertainty, and the treatment of apparent sluggishness in policy rate changes. Increased policy rate variability associated with more aggressive policy may raise term premia and longer-maturity market interest rates, and, thus, constrain economic activity. This potential effect of policy is excluded in standard simulations of alternative policy rules. Results suggest that the effect on term premia of more aggressive policy is nontrivial.
The next section discusses two alternative models of persistence in the policy rate, a partial adjustment model of policy and an AR error model of policy. Two models are considered since the data does not clearly support one model over the other, yet implications of changes in policy rate and economic uncertainty for term premia may depend on the specification chosen to represent policy. Section 3 reviews a model of the term structure, including an explicit expression for term premia. Section 4 calculates the 10-year term premium for estimates of model coefficients based on different historical policy episodes. Empirical results suggest that estimated term premia depend on how policy is modeled and that time variation in term premia has likely been sizable historically. In addition, by using results from published studies, the effects on term premia of more aggressive policy are shown to be economically important. The analysis raises serious questions about the applicability of optimal policy rule specifications based on models that exclude term-premium effects.
Modeling policy and economic activity
This section describes the macroeconomic structure that will be used in the model of the term structure of interest rates and term premia presented in section 3.
The basic Taylor (1993a) rule representation of monetary policy is reviewed in the first subsection. The next two subsections present partial adjustment and AR-error generalizations of the Taylor rule that provide better fits of historical policy decisions.
In the final subsection, a small reduced-form VAR model of macroeconomic activity is introduced. The specification nests both partial adjustment and AR-error models of policy. Taylor (1993a) suggested that the target of the policy rate be set according to the deviation of inflation from the policy target for inflation and the deviation of output from potential. Thus, Taylor recommended a rule of the form:
The Taylor rule
where r * is the Taylor-rule recommendation for the policy rate target,ρ is the equilibrium real policy rate, π is inflation,π is the policy target for inflation, and y is the output gap. Taylor used δ y = 0.5 as the weight on the output gap and δ π = 1.5 as the total weight on inflation.
Taylor rule specifications that are forward-looking with respect to inflation have been found to be empirically supported by Kozicki (1999) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , among others. Table 1 summarizes estimation results over a collection of samples for regressions of the federal funds rate on a constant (assumed to include the equilibrium policy rate and the policy target), expected inflation, and the output gap:
In these regressions, r t is the federal funds rate, E t π t,t+4 is expected inflation over the four quarters from t to t + 4 as measured using the median of expected inflation from 
A Partial Adjustment Model of Policy
The Taylor (1993a) specification and versions with estimated coefficients yield policy recommendations that are at times similar to the target of the policy rate, but, as noted by Kozicki (1999) , deviations tend to be persistent. The most common approach to improving the fit of policy rule recommendations to actual policy decisions, is to assume that policy only partially adjusts to the target in any one period:
where r t is the one-period interest rate, and 1,t is a transitory, white noise policy shock. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) estimate similar rules.
Empirical results from estimation of a partial adjustment model are provided in the second panel of 
corresponding to (3) with r * t = c + δ π E t π t,t+4 + δ yỹt . Estimation uses nonlinear instrumental variables with the same set of instruments as was used for the first panel. Estimates of the responsiveness of policy to output gaps and inflation are 3 Inflation and expected inflation are measured using the GDP deflator.
generally larger than in the first panel, and in several samples are significantly larger than Taylor's weights. Estimates of the persistence parameter λ range from 0.71 to 0.84, suggesting considerable persistence in the policy rate. Woodford (1999) , Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) , and Sack (1998) are recent examples of papers that interpret estimates of λ close to one as implying that the monetary authority only gradually adjusts to its target policy rate, so that central banks smooth interest rate movements. Under this interpretation, estimates of λ on the order of 0.8 for quarterly data imply considerable monetary policy inertia, as in any quarter, the central bank only adjusts the policy rate by 20 percent of the change recommended by a Taylor-type policy rule.
An AR Error Model of Policy
Rudebusch (2002) These arguments suggest considering the following alternative description of policy decisions:
in which the deviation of the policy rate from the Taylor-rule recommendation is assumed to follow an AR(1) error process. This description of policy can be rewritten
where 1,t is assumed to serially uncorrelated.
Empirical results from estimation of:
are provided in the third panel of Table 1 , labeled AR Error Model. Estimation is by nonlinear instrumental variables using the same instrument set as was used for the first two panels. Estimates of the responsiveness of policy to the output gap are insignificantly different from Taylor's weight of 0.5, however, estimates of the coefficient on expected inflation are generally smaller than 1.5, and significantly so in some cases.
The two policy specifications are nested by the following reduced form specification
In the partial adjustment model, a 1 + a 2 = 1 and a 3 = 0, and in the AR error model, a 1 − a 3 = 0 and a 2 = 1. Rudebusch (2001) tested the restrictions of these two specifications to assess whether the data rejected one model but not the other.
However, he found that results were fragile, depending on the sample used during estimation.
Another approach to assessing the interpretation of the partial adjustment model compares properties of estimated Taylor rule deviations to deviations of policy from estimated partial adjustment model recommendations after substituting out the lagged policy rate. After backward substitution, the partial adjustment model can be rewritten as:
where υ t is an approximation error equal to the difference between the infinite sum in the first line above and the finite sum in the second. As the number of terms in the finite sum, n, increases, the approximation error converges to zero. If the partial adjustment interpretation is correct, then it seems reasonable to conclude that most of the variation in the policy rate should be due to the sum of lagged r * . In addition, the deviations of the policy rate from the sum of lagged r * s,
should be smaller than deviations of the policy rate from the estimated Taylor rule, r t − r * t . Table 2 
A reduced form VAR model
To distinguish between the implications of the partial adjustment policy rule (3) from those of the AR-error policy rule (5) for the term structure of interest rates, it is sufficient to consider a two-variable AR model of the economy which follows a simple autoregression defined in terms of the policy rate, r t , and the Taylor-rule recommendation, r * t . However, to do so requires a specification for the time-evolution of r * t . Assume r * t evolves according to:
with E t−1 [ 1,t 2,t ] = 0. The Taylor rule recommendation is a function of the output gap and inflation, r * t = (ρ − δ ππ ) + δ π E t π t,t+4 + δ yỹt with δ π ≥ 0 and δ y ≥ 0, so it provides a summary of the state of the economy. Because estimates of the output gap and inflation are strongly persistent, γ * is expected to be close to one. By contrast, γ r is likely to be negative, reflecting that increases in the policy rate are expected to reduce both output and inflation.
Estimates of γ r and γ * are provided in Table 3 Both partial adjustment and AR-error policy specifications imply a vector AR (1) representation
where
) is a diagonal matrix with ith diagonal entry σ 2 i and σ 2 3 = 0. For the partial adjustment specification
and for the AR-error specification
The general structure in (12) will be used to represent the evolution of the state variables that are relevant for pricing nominal assets. The next section reviews the model of the term structure. The expression for the term premium will be shown to depend on the policy rule specification through the VAR coefficient matrices, H 1 and H 2 , and on policy rate variability through the variance covariance matrix of economic shocks, Σ.
A model of the government term structure
The model of the nominal term structure is the same as in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a and 2001b) . The nominal price in period t of an n-period nominal bond which pays $1 at t + n is:
( 1 5 ) where M t+1 is a nominal stochastic discount factor. Recursive substitution yields the following alternative expression for P n,t :
Assuming joint log normality,
where p n,t = log(P n,t ) and m t+i = log(M t+i ). Since the continuous-time yield to maturity on the bond is defined as r n,t ≡ (−1/n)p n,t , it follows that
so that the bond rate is determined by moments of the finite sum of the stochastic discount factor. The stochastic discount factor provides the link between the valuation of asset payoffs and states of the economy.
In conventional finance models, the stochastic discount factor is often specified to be a function of a short-term interest rate that evolves according to an AR process.
For the purposes of macroeconomic analaysis, it would be more natural to assume the policy rate is generated by a macro VAR which includes the policy feedback rule, but the algebra for this can get tedious, vid. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a) . Here, we use the two-variable VAR outlined in section 2.4 to model evolution of the states, z t .
The log stochastic discount factor is assumed to be a linear function of the states,
where β, often referred to as the "price of risk," determines the covariance between innovations to the stochastic discount factor and innovations to the variables in z, v t+1 is a shock with
, and E t (v t+i t+j ) = 0 for i, j > 0. Although the derivation allows for the pricing of economic uncertainty, E t 2 2t , we leave analysis of this to future research as the focus of this article is on the relationship between policy uncertainty and term premia. Consequently, for the remainder of the paper, the assumption β = [β 1 , 0, 0] 0 is employed.
Conditional on the information in period t, the VAR specification in (12) implies that the future evolution of the state variable will take the form
Using (19) and (20), the evolution of the stochastic discount factor is
and an expression for the finite sum of the stochastic discount factor obtained by
The coefficients in (21) can be determined from the one-period version of (18) which defines an expression for the short rate:
Since z t contains r t , this expression is satisfied for a = [1 0
An expression that relates a multi-period yield to expected short rates and a term premium can be derived by substituting for the mean and variance of the stochastic discount factor sum in (18). Using the solution for a, the mean of the stochastic discount factor sum (21) is
and the variance of the stochastic discount factor sum is
Substituting into (18), the n-period bond yield is the sum of expected short rates and a term premium, φ n :
where, the term premium is equal to:
The term premium will be positive if β 1 is sufficiently negative.
The dependence of the term premium on monetary policy shows up in H 1 and H 2 , the matrices which summarize the evolution of the economy including the policy rule specification, and in Σ, which summarizes economic and policy rate uncertainty. For both policy specifications, H 1 depends on the responsiveness of economic activity to the policy rate (captured by γ r ) and on the degree of persistence in economic activity (captured by γ * ). In addition, for the partial adjustment model, H 1 and H 2 depend on the persistence parameter λ that influences policy smoothness. More aggressive monetary policy may involve less policy persistence (λ closer to zero), or may reduce the persistence of shocks to economic activity (reduce γ * ) and thereby affect the term premium. In addition, increased policy rate variability that accompanies more aggressive monetary policy may affect the term premium through Σ.
Estimates of the 10-year Term Premium
This section starts with an examination of the effects on the size of the estimated 10-year term premium of shifts in estimated coefficients. Since results are based on empirical estimates using U.S. data, this analysis can only provide evidence on the size of model-based explanations of likely shifts in term premia historically. To provide a sense of the likely effects on term premia of increases in interest rate variability associated with a move to more aggressive "optimal" monetary policy rules, calculations must be based on results from counterfactual simulations. Statistics from published studies of such counterfactual simulations are used to assess the likely impact on term premia of more aggressive policy.
Key to these calculations is the link between policy rate uncertainty and Σ. The first subsection uses standard errors from estimated policy rules to estimate Σ. The second subsection explores the consequences of assumptions that relate Σ directly to policy rate variability. Tables 1 and 3 . The standard errors of the estimated policy rule, provided in the final column of Table 1 , are used to approximate policy-rate uncertainty-σ 1 , the standard deviation of 1t .
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Estimates of the term premium also depend on β 1 . In studies where the stochastic 5 Tinsley (1999) discusses the consequences for term premia of reduced policy rate uncertainty and policies aimed at credible enforcement of upper or lower boundaries on segments of the term structure.
6 The standard errors of the reduced form r * equation, provided in the final column of Table 3 , could be used to approximate economic uncertainty-σ 2 , the standard deviation of 2t . However, as the price associated with this source of risk is restricted to equal zero, the value chosen for σ 2 is irrelevant for cacluations of the term premium. discount factor is restricted to be a function of a single variable equal to the one-period rate, estimates of β 1 have been obtained to fit the average yield spread between long and short maturity yields, given estimates of coeffiecients in H 1 , H 2 , and Σ. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) estimate β 1 to be -122. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b) provide several estimates of β 1 , that differ across alternative time-series specifications for the short rate. Their estimates range from -148 to -383. Since it is difficult to identify β 1 without a more complete model, a large range of values of β 1 are considered.
Term premium estimates are provided in Table 4 in 1971-1979, and to 2.61 in 1971-1982 for the AR error model of policy. In the same periods, the partial adjustment model implies term premium estimates of -0.08, 0.11, and 0.51 for β 1 = −350. These differences are economically important. Of course, it is possible that the term premium is actually constant over time, but that β 1 varies over time in such a way as to negate the implications of shifts in Σ or other parameters. However, while time variation in β 1 is possible, variation constrained to exactly counteract the implications of shifts in other parameters is unlikely.
Third, to obtain the same magnitude estimate of the term premium, the partial adjustment model requires a much more negative value of β 1 . For instance, over the 1971 through 2000 sample, estimates of the term premium for the AR error model are roughly twice as large as those for the partial adjustment model for any give value of β 1 . In other words, for this sample, the partial adjustment model would require a price of risk that is twice as large in magnitude to generate the same size term premium.
Overall, these results suggest two important conclusions: estimates of term premia depend on how policy is modeled and historical variation in term premia is sufficiently large to be economically significant. An implication of the conclusions is that log-linear models that assume constant term premia are missing a feature of the economy that is relevant for policy analysis. Consequently, conclusions about the specification of optimal policy rules based on counterfactual simulations of these models are subject to the Lucas Critique.
The next section explores the implications for term premia of increases in policy rate variability associated with "optimal" policy that is more aggressive than empirical estimates of historical policy.
Estimates of effects on term premia of more aggressive policy
Several recent studies have suggested that historical U.S. monetary policy has not been optimal. In particular, these studies argue that a policy that responded more aggressively to output gaps and/or deviations of inflation from target would have achieved a better macroeconomic outcome-better in the sense of lower inflation or output gap variability. However, more aggressive policy also tends to lead to higher policy rate variability. This section provides estimates of the effect on term premia of higher policy rate variability. Table 5 provides examples from three recent studies of the effect of more aggressive monetary policy on the standard devation of the policy interest rate and the standard deviation of the change in the policy rate. Using their own model (RS), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) found that an increase in the weight on the output gap in a Taylor rule from 0.5 to 1.0 increased the standard deviation of the change in the policy rate from 0.71 to 1.03, a factor of 1.45. The optimal policy for their specified policy loss function was much more aggressive than either of these policy rule specifications and involved weights of 2.72 on inflation and 1.57 on the output gap. This policy resulted in more than a doubling of the standard deviation of the change in the policy rate compared to the original Taylor rule. Effects on the standard deviation of the policy rate were much smaller. Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) also calculated the standard deviation of the policy rate and the standard deviation of the change in the policy rate for the original Taylor rule and for a rule with a unit weight on the output gap. They provided results for four different structural macroeconomic models: the Fuhrer-Moore (1995) model ( Simulation results from Williams (1999) find large effects on the standard deviation on the change in the interest rate when both weights in a Taylor rule are increased. Williams used two versions of the Federal Reserve Board staff model, FRB-RE which assumes rational expectations and FRB-VAR which uses VAR approximations to expectations. While effects on the standard deviation of the change in the interest rate were similar to those obtained by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , effects on the standard deviation of the policy rate were larger.
Increases in policy rate variability will have implications for term premia if the conditional variance of the policy rate, σ 2 1 , is related to unconditional policy rate variability, SD(r), or to unconditional variability of the change in the policy rate, SD(∆r). Either one of these is likely to be a reasonable assumption. Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff, and Sanders (1992) find that most models that successfully capture dynamics of the short term interest rate allow the volatility of interest rate changes to be a function of the level of the interest rate.
7 And, the change in the policy rate and the policy shock 1,t are highly correlated over 1971-2000. The correlation coefficient is 0.86 for the partial adjustment model of policy and 0.83 for the AR error model of policy. Table 6 provides additional evidence that suggests that the variance of 1,t is likely related to the level of the policy rate or to policy variability (measured as either the variance of the policy rate or the variance of the change in the policy rate). The Correlations between both approximations to the conditional variance and the four policy variables are high. 8 MA(8) approximations to the conditional variances 7 It is commonplace in the finance literature to assume that the conditional variance of a short-term interest rate is a function of the level of the interest rate. See, for example, the square-root model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) , the geometric Brownian motion model of Black and Scholes (1973) and related specifications by Dothan (1978) and Brennan and Schwartz (1980) , the variable rate model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1980) , and the constant elasticity of variance process of Cox and Ross (1976) . These results suggest that it is reasonable to map changes in policy variability that accompany more aggressive policy into changes in the conditional variance of policy,
Σ, that appears in term premia expressions.
The results of Rudebusch and Svensson, suggest that the standard deviation of the change in the policy rate increases by a factor of between 1.69 and 2.45 when a rule that resembles historical policy is replaced in counterfactual simulations with an "optimal rule." This implies that the variance increases by a factor of between 2.8 and 6.0. Given the apparent proportional relationship between the variance of the change in the policy rate and Σ, this implies that, all else equal, term premia will be higher by a factor of betwen 2.8 and 6.0. This is a huge effect. Over the 1971-2000 period, the average spread between the 10-year Treasury yield and the federal funds rate (an approximation to the average term premium on the 10-year Treasury yield) was 0.82 percent. Multiplying this by the higher variance factors implies an increase in the term premium of between 1.48 percentage points and 4.1 percentage points.
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While the results in this section are only meant to be suggestive, they do provide strong evidence to suggest that term premia may respond to changes in monetary policy regimes. Consequently, findings that optimal policy is more aggressive than estimates of historical policy, may not hold up once the models are generalized to include a link between increased policy rate variability and increased term premia.
9 Because these estimates hold everything else constant, they don't take account of other effects of more aggressive policy that may reduce the term premium. For example, in the VAR of section 2.4, more aggressive policy may influence the responsiveness persistence of non-policy shocks (by affecting γ * in the VAR) or the responsiveness of economic activity to policy (by affecting γ r in the VAR). Thus, the estimates of the effects on term premia likely provide an upper bound to the true effect.
Concluding Comments
Structural macro models have been used to evaluate alternative monetary policies and identify the "optimal" policy that would minimize a specified loss function.
By using structural specifications, researchers hope their results are not subject to the Lucas critique. Unfortunately, the real world applicability of results from such counterfactual simulations is questionable. By not modeling term premia, the structural specifications used for policy evaluation are missing an important link between policy and economic activity. This paper shows that estimates of term premia depend on how policy is modeled and that historical variation in term premia has likely been considerable.
Furthermore, moving from a representative estimated historical policy rule to a typical optimal rule with more aggressive policy responses involves an economically important increase in term premia. Consequently, until structural models used to evaluate monetary policy are generalized to include potential links between policy and term premia, it would be premature to assume more aggressive monetary policy would be preferable when making real world policy decisions. Entries are square root of mean squared deviations of back-substituted approximations to the partial adjustment model from the funds rate. 
